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Abstract
Interest rate decisions by central banks are universally discussed in terms of Taylor rules,
which describe policy rates as responding to ination and some measure of the output gap.
We show that an alternative specication of the monetary policy reaction function, in which
the interest rate tracks the evolution of a Wicksellian ecient rate of return as the primary
indicator of real activity, ts the U.S. data better than otherwise identical Taylor rules. This
surprising result holds for a wide variety of specications of the other ingredients of the
policy rule and of approaches to the measurement of the output gap. Moreover, it is robust
across two dierent models of private agents' behavior.
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Tambalotti)1. Introduction
Interest rate rules are the tool of choice for economists and practitioners when describing
the conduct of monetary policy. Following Taylor (1993), these rules usually model the
short-term interest rate as set in reaction to deviations of ination from a target, and of
output from some measure of \potential." A very large literature has shown that these
two arguments, usually coupled with some inertia in the policy rate, provide an accurate
description of the observed evolution of the Federal Funds rate in the United States over
the last several decades (e.g., Judd and Rudebusch, 1998; Clarida et al., 1999, 2000; English
et al., 2003; Orphanides, 2003; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2011).
This paper proposes an alternative characterization of the factors inuencing this evo-
lution. Our main nding is that policy rules in which the interest rate is set to track a
measure of the ecient real rate|the real interest rate that would prevail if the economy
were perfectly competitive|t the data better than rules in which the output gap is the
primary measure of real economic activity. We refer to the former as W rules, from Knut
Wicksell (1898), who was the rst to cast the problem of monetary policy as an attempt to
track a \neutral" interest rate solely determined by real factors.1
To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to demonstrate the empirical plausibility of
interest rate rules that respond to the ecient real rate.2 Although these rules have not been
previously examined in the empirical literature, the idea that a neutral, or \equilibrium",
interest rate might represent a useful reference point for monetary policy was familiar to
Federal Reserve policymakers well before Woodford (2003) revitalized its Wicksellian roots.3
For example, in his Humphrey Hawkins testimony to Congress in May 1993, Federal Reserve
1We do not call these rules Wicksellian because Woodford (2003) and Giannoni (2012) already use this
term to refer to interest rate rules that respond to the price level, rather than to ination.
2Trehan and Wu (2007) discuss the biases in the reduced-form estimation of policy rules with a constant
intercept, when in fact the central bank responds to a time-varying equilibrium real rate, but they do not
estimate this response.
3King and Wolman (1999) were the rst to show that, in a New Keynesian model, it is optimal for the
interest rate to track its ecient counterpart.
2Chairman Alan Greenspan stated that
\...In assessing real rates, the central issue is their relationship to an equilib-
rium interest rate, specically, the real rate level that, if maintained, would keep
the economy at its production potential over time. Rates persisting above that
level, history tells us, tend to be associated with slack, disination, and economic
stagnation|below that level with eventual resource bottlenecks and rising ina-
tion, which ultimately engenders economic contraction. Maintaining the real
rate around its equilibrium level should have a stabilizing eect on the economy,
directing production toward its long-term potential."4
Evaluating the extent to which Greenspan's reasoning had a measurable impact on the ob-
served evolution of policy rates in the U.S. requires a structural model, since the equilibrium
real rate he describes is a counterfactual object. We compute this counterfactual within
two variants of the standard New Keynesian DSGE model with monopolistic competition
and sticky prices, estimated on data for the Federal Funds rate (FFR), ination and GDP
growth, as in the empirical literature on Taylor rules.
Given this framework, we follow Greenspan's qualitative description of the equilibrium
interest rate and compute the counterfactual \real rate level that, if maintained, would keep
the economy at its production potential over time." If we dene \production potential"
as the ecient level of aggregate output ye
t; as in Justiniano et al. (2011) for instance,
the equilibrium real rate corresponds to the ecient rate of return re
t. This interest rate is
ecient because it is the one that would prevail if markets were perfectly competitive, rather
than distorted by monopoly power and price dispersion.
Our exploration of the t of W rules starts from a very simple specication, in which the
4Quantitative measures of this equilibrium interest rate are a regular input in the monetary policy debate
at the Federal Reserve. A chart with a range of estimates of this rate is included in most published Bluebooks
at least since May 2001. According to McCallum and Nelson (2011), this construct emerged in the early
1990s at the Federal Reserve as a gauge of the monetary policy stance following a shift of emphasis away
from monetary aggregates, due to the diculty of estimating a non-inationary growth rate of money in the
midst of nancial innovation. See also Amato (2005).
3FFR closes the gap with re
t over time, and responds to ination, as in
it = it 1 + (1   )(r
e
t + t) + "
i
t:
We compare the empirical performance of this baseline W rule with that of a more traditional
T rule based on Taylor (1993), in which economic slack is measured by the output gap.
The model's ability to t the data deteriorates signicantly under the latter specication.
We then illustrate the robustness of this surprising nding to several variations in the other
ingredients of the policy rule|including the measurement of the output gap, and the presence
of a time-varying ination target|as well as in the specication of the rest of the DSGE
model.
Methodologically, we follow a full-information, Bayesian empirical strategy. First, we
couple each of the policy rules whose t we wish to evaluate with the private sector's tastes
and technology described by the DSGE model. This step results in a set of econometric
models, one for each policy specication. Second, we estimate all these models and compare
their t using marginal data densities.5
This criterion measures each model's overall ability to t the data, rather than that of
the policy equation alone, relative to a reference model, which in our case is that associated
with the W rule. This is the only formal approach to evaluating t in the general equilibrium
context called for by the need to compute the counterfactual ecient real rate. However,
we also complement this approach with some more informal indicators of how well dierent
policy rules account for the evolution of the FFR, and of the extent to which the resulting
model is more or less sensible.
Aside from pointing to W rules as a promising tool to describe interest rate setting in
practice, our exploration of the t of many of the policy specications used in DSGE and
other applied work in monetary economics suggests that this often neglected component of
structural models can have a signicant impact on their t. The gap in marginal likelihoods
5An and Schorfheide (2007) provide a comprehensive survey of the application of Bayesian methods to the
estimation and comparison of DSGE models. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) use similar methods to estimate
the response of monetary policy to exchange rate movements in several small open economies.
4between the best and worst tting rules included in this study can be as high as fty log-
points. As a reference, these dierences in t are of a similar order of magnitude as those
between structural models estimated with or without stochastic volatility found by C urdia
et al. (2011). This evidence therefore underscores the importance for DSGE researchers of
paying signicantly more attention to the specication of monetary policy than common so
far.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our baseline model of private
sector behavior, denes its ecient equilibrium and the associated levels of output and of
the real interest rate, and introduces the baseline W and T rules. Section 3 discusses the
methodology for the estimation and comparison of the models. Section 4 presents results
for the baseline policy rules, making the case for the empirical superiority of the W rule.
Section 5 explores the robustness of this conclusion to alternative specications of the policy
rules, and of the private sector's tastes and technology. Section 6 concludes. An online
Appendix contains a larger set of robustness results, along with a more detailed description
of the baseline model and other supporting material.
2. A Simple Model of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
This section outlines the log-linear approximation of the simple New-Keynesian model we
bring to the data. The model describes the behavior of households and rms, with an interest
rate feedback rule capturing the response of monetary policy to economic developments.
Dierent specications of this reaction function, coupled with the same tastes and technology
for the private sector, give rise to dierent empirical models. Details on the microfoundations
are in the online Appendix.
An intertemporal Euler equation and a Phillips curve summarize the behavior of the
private sector. Optimal consumption and saving decisions produce the Euler equation
~ xt = Et~ xt+1   '
 1
 (it   Ett+1   r
e
t); (1)
which states that current real activity, measured by the variable ~ xt  (xe
t   xe
t 1)  
Et(xe
t+1   xe
t), depends on future expected real activity and on the gap between the
5ex-ante real interest rate, it Ett+1, and its ecient level re
t. Here, it is the nominal interest
rate, t is ination, and xe
t  yt   ye
t is the ecient output gap, i.e. the log-deviation of
output, yt from its ecient level ye
t.
The optimal pricing decisions of rms produce the Phillips curve
~ t =  (!x
e
t + '~ xt) + Et~ t+1 + ut; (2)
relating a measure of current ination, ~ t  t   t 1; to expected future ination, real
activity and an AR(1) cost-push shock ut, generated by exogenous uctuations in desired
markups.
These two equations augment the purely forward-looking textbook version of the New
Keynesian model with two sources of inertia, which improve its ability to t the data. On
the demand side, utility features internal habits in consumption, parametrized by . On
the supply side, the prices that are not re-optimized in each period increase automatically
with past ination, by a proportion .
This model of private sector behavior is more stylized than in the workhorse empirical
DSGE framework of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). In particular, it
abstracts from capital accumulation and the attending frictions (endogenous utilization and
investment adjustment costs) and from non-competitive features in the labor market (mo-
nopolistic competition and sticky wages). Nevertheless, it provides a reasonable description
of the data on GDP, ination and the interest rate|the series that are typically considered
in the estimation of interest rate rules. Another advantage of working with a stripped-down
baseline specication is that it made it possible to explore the robustness of the paper's main
nding across a very large number of interest rate rules, without having to worry about com-
putational constraints. Nevertheless, section 5.3 shows that W rules also outperform T rules
in a medium-scale model.
2.1. Output and the Real Interest Rate in the Ecient Equilibrium
Ecient output, denoted by ye
t; and the ecient real interest rate, denoted by re
t; are
central constructs in our analysis. They represent the levels of output and of the real
6interest rate that would be observed in a counterfactual economy in which (i) prices are|
and have always been|exible, and (ii) desired markups are zero. In our framework, these
assumptions result in a perfectly competitive economy, which would therefore deliver the
ecient allocation. The corresponding equilibrium represents a \parallel universe", which
evolves independently from the outcomes observed in the actual economy (Neiss and Nelson,
2003).
In this parallel universe, ecient output, expressed in deviation from the balanced growth
path, evolves according to
!y
e
t + '(y
e
t   y
e
t 1)   '(Ety
e
t+1   y
e
t) = '(Ett+1   t) +

1   
Ett+1: (3)
This equation implies that ye
t is a linear combination of past, current, and future expected
values of productivity growth t and of the intertemporal taste shock t. These exogenous
disturbances both follow AR(1) processes.
Given ye
t; the intertemporal Euler equation implies
r
e
t = Ett+1 + Ett+1   !Ety
e
t+1; (4)
from which we observe that the ecient real rate depends positively on the forecastable
components of next period's productivity growth and preference shock, and negatively on
those of the growth rate of ecient output, ye
t+1. Intuitively, an increase in households'
desire to consume early, which is captured by a persistent rise in t; puts upward pressure on
the ecient real rate, so as to dissuade consumers from acting on their desire to anticipate
consumption. Similarly, higher expected productivity growth requires steeper consumption
proles, and hence a higher real rate. Finally, the last term captures the negative eect on
the interest rate of a higher expected growth rate of marginal utility, which in the ecient
equilibrium is connected with the growth rate of hours, and hence of output.
These last two expressions highlight the close connection between the ecient levels of
output and of the real rate, while Euler equation (1) ties together their respective gaps.
According to (1), an interest rate gap maintained at zero forever closes the output gap, and
vice versa. This observation suggests that re
t can be a useful target for monetary policy in
7alternative to the ecient level of output, as an indicator of the economy's potential. In
the context of policy rules, this alternative approach to assessing the amount of slack in the
economy can be captured by an interest rate that tracks its ecient counter part, as in the
W rules presented below.
2.2. Monetary Policy: Baseline W and T Rules
To set up the comparison between policy rules that track the ecient real rate, or W
rules, and those that react to the output gap instead, or T rules, we begin our analysis with
two particularly simple specications.
In the baseline W rule, the policy rate responds to the ecient real rate and to ination,
with some inertia, as in
it = it 1 + (1   )(r
e
t + t) + "
i
t: (5)
The coecient on re
t is restricted to one because this indicator represents a target for the
actual interest rate. When the ecient rate rises, say because of an increase in households'
desire to consume today, the actual rate follows, so as to close the interest rate gap, and
hence keep output close to its ecient level.
In the baseline T rule, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate in response to
ination and the ecient output gap
it = it 1 + (1   )(t + xx
e
t) + "
i
t: (6)
In this case, demand pressures are captured by the deviation of output from its ecient
level, to which the central bank reacts by increasing the policy rate.
Therefore, both baseline rules capture the typical reaction of monetary policy to real
economic developments. In the W rule, these developments are summarized by the ecient
real rate. In the T rule, they are captured by the output gap.
To bridge the gap between the empirical literature on interest rate rules and this paper's
DSGE framework, equation (6) denes the output gap as the deviation of output from its
ecient level. This choice, which might be controversial, is dictated by two considerations.
First, it is internally consistent, since in our model xe
t is both the fundamental driver of
8ination and the measure of slack that is relevant for welfare (e.g. Woodford, 2003). Second,
the ecient output gap is a direct counterpart to the ecient real interest rate that measures
economic activity in the baseline W rule.
The main drawback of this modeling choice is that computing xe
t requires a fully-specied
model, while most of the measures featured in the empirical literature do not. For this reason,
we later extend the comparison between W and T rules to specications that include other
denitions of the output gap, such as ones based on the HP and other statistical lters.
As we pointed out in the previous section, if monetary policy ensured that it Ett+1 = re
t
in every period, the output gap would always be zero and aggregate output would never
deviate from its ecient level. But if this is the case, why include ination in the W rules?
The main reason is that with output at its ecient level, cost-push shocks pass-through to
ination entirely, as we can see by solving equation (2) forward with yt = ye
t, 8t
t = t 1 +
1 X
s=0

sEtut+s:
The resulting uctuations in ination produce inecient dispersion of prices and production
levels across goods varieties, even if aggregate output is at its ecient level, making this pol-
icy undesirable. At the other extreme, perfect ination stabilization causes cost-push shocks
to show-through entirely in deviations of output from its ecient level, which is also sub-
optimal.6 Optimal policy, therefore, distributes the impact of these shocks between output
and ination, balancing the objectives of price stability and ecient aggregate production.
The W rule mimics this trade-o by including an ination term, just like T rules do.7
6Woodford (2003) calls \natural" the levels of output and of the real interest rate observed in this
equilibrium with stable ination. Barsky et al. (forthcoming) discuss the relationship between natural and
ecient equilibria in New Keynesian models and the neutral rate of interest in Wicksell (1898). Justiniano
et al. (2011) connect these concepts to optimal policy.
7Another reason why it = re
t + Ett+1 is not a viable policy rule is that it does not satisfy the Taylor
principle and would hence give rise to indeterminacy.
93. Inference
We estimate the two alternative models associated with the W and T rules laid out
in the previous section|and the many variants discussed below|with Bayesian methods,
as surveyed for example by An and Schorfheide (2007). Bayesian estimation combines prior
information on the model's parameters with its likelihood function to form a posterior density,
from which we draw using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. We construct
the likelihood using the Kalman lter based on the state-space representation of the rational
expectations solution of each model under consideration, setting to zero the prior probability
of the congurations of parameters that imply indeterminacy.
The observation equations are
logGDPt =  + yt   yt 1 + t
logPCEt = 
 + t
FFRt = r + 
 + it;
where GDPt is real GDP, PCEt is the core PCE deator (ex-food and energy), and FFRt
is the average eective Federal Funds Rate (henceforth FFR), all sampled at a quarterly fre-
quency. The constants in these equations represent the average growth rate of productivity
(), the long run ination target (), and the average real interest rate (r). The sample pe-
riod runs from 1987:Q3 to 2009:Q3, although the main results are not aected by truncating
the sample either at 2008:Q4, when the FFR rst hit the zero bound, or at 2006:Q4, before
the eruption of the recent nancial crisis. We start the sample on the date in which Alan
Greenspan became chairman of the Federal Reserve because this period is characterized by
a reasonably homogenous approach to monetary policy, which is well-approximated by a
stable interest rate rule.
Table 1 reports our choice of priors, which are shared across all the models we estimate.
On the demand side, we calibrate the discount factor as  = 0:99. This parameter, together
with the balanced growth rate , and the habit coecient , determines the slope of the
Euler equation (1), ' 1
  (1   )(1   ); with   e .
10On the supply side, the slope of the Phillips curve is also a function of deep parameters,
 = (1   )(1   )=[(1 + !)], where  is the fraction of rms that do not change their
price in any given period,  is the elasticity of demand faced by each monopolistic producer
and ! is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Given our observables, only the slope 
can be identied. Its prior, centered around 0:1, is somewhat higher than typical estimates
of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (e.g. Gal  and Gertler, 2007; Sbordone, 2002), but
consistent with the low degree of price stickiness found in microeconomic studies such as
Bils and Klenow (2004), given reasonable values for ! and .8
In the interest rate rules, the prior on the smoothing parameter  has a dispersion wide
enough to encompass most existing estimates. The priors for the feedback coecients on
ination  and real activity x are centered around the original Taylor (1993) values of 1.5
and 0.5, respectively.
To evaluate the t of dierent policy rules, we compare the marginal data densities (or
posterior probabilities) of the corresponding models. All these models share equations (1) and
(2), but each is closed with a dierent interest rate rule. We estimate each model separately
with the same data and priors, and compute its posterior probability using the modied
harmonic mean estimator proposed by Geweke (1999). To compare t across models, we
calculate KR ratios, dened as two times the log of the Bayes factor.9 Kass and Raftery
(1995) recommend this measure of relative t since its scale is the same as that of a classic
Likelihood Ratio statistic. They suggest that values of KR above 10 can be considered \very
strong" evidence in favor of a model. Values between 6 and 10 represent \strong" evidence,
between 2 and 6 \positive" evidence, while values below 2 are \not worth more than a bare
mention."
8For example, with ! = 1 and  = 8; which corresponds to a desired markup of 14%,  = 0:1 implies
 = 0:4; or an expected duration of prices of about ve months.
9The Bayes factor of one model against another is the ratio of their marginal likelihoods.
114. Results: Wicksell or Taylor?
This section illustrates the central result of the paper: the baseline W rule ts the
data better than its T counterpart. Subsequent sections demonstrate that the superior
empirical performance of W rules extends well beyond the baseline specication and remains
remarkably robust across dozens of variations on the ingredients of the rule, as well as in a
richer DSGE model. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to document the excellent
performance of W rules as tools to describe observed monetary policy behavior.
Table 2 reports the posterior estimates of the parameters under the two baseline policy
specications, together with the models' marginal likelihoods and the implied KR criterion.
The table conveys the excellent empirical performance of the W rule along three dimensions.
First, the nearly eleven point dierence in log-marginal likelihoods between the two models
translates into a KR ratio above 20, which represents very strong evidence in favor of the
model featuring the W rule. This is the most formal and reliable piece of evidence in favor
of this policy specication.
Second, the posterior estimates of the parameters support this evidence and provide
some insight into the empirical diculties of the baseline T specication. For instance, the
posterior of the slope of the Phillips curve  is concentrated near extremely low values under
this specication, with a median of 0:0021. This value is two orders of magnitude smaller
than the prior mean and at the extreme lower end of the available estimates in the DSGE
literature (see, for example, the survey by Schorfheide, 2008).
A coecient this low implies no discernible trade-o between ination and real activity,
so that ination is close to an exogenous process driven by movements in desired markups.
As a consequence, it becomes hard to distinguish between ination indexation and persistent
markup shocks as drivers of the observed ination persistence. This lack of identication is
reected in bimodal posterior distributions of the parameters  and u; which are generated
by MCMC draws with high  and low u, or vice versa, as shown in Appendix C. These
draws correspond to local peaks of the joint posterior density of similar heights.
Finally, the interest rate rule coecients imply a fairly strong reaction of policy to the
output gap, but an extremely weak reaction to ination, with a substantial fraction of the
12posterior draws for  below one. These values are at odds with the large empirical literature
that has found a forceful reaction to ination to be one of the hallmarks of U.S. monetary
policy since the mid-eighties.10 None of these problems appears in the model with the W
rule, from which we conclude that this specication also provides a more sensible description
of the data.
The two indicators of the empirical plausibility of the W rule considered so far speak to
the overall model's ability to account for the evolution of the entire vector of observables,
rather than pointing to the success of the policy specication by itself. The last evaluation
criterion we consider, therefore, focuses more narrowly on the extent to which the systematic
component of the policy rule accounts for the observed movements in the FFR, in the spirit
of the R2 in a regression.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any formal approach to evaluating the t of an
individual equation in a DSGE model estimated with full-information methods. As an
impressionistic alternative, the third row of Table 2 reports the standard deviation of the
smoothed sequence of monetary policy shocks in each specication, denoted by Std("i
tjT).
This statistic measures the observed variation in the FFR left unexplained by the feedback
component of the policy rule. It is the \sample analog" of the posterior estimate of the
standard deviation of the monetary policy shock, i, and is usually very close to the median
of its posterior.
This standard deviation is 29 basis points for the W rule and 30 basis points for the T
rule, a minor dierence. However, the dierence is larger (25 basis points for the W rule
compared to 32 for the T rule) if we drop from the sample the recent recession, in which
the nominal interest rate has fallen to its zero lower bound. This evidence suggests that
in \normal" times the W rule accounts more closely for the systematic behavior of interest
rates than the T rule. This advantage diminishes when a deep downturn drives the ecient
interest rate well below the zero lower bound, as it did in the Great Recession.
10Values of  lower than one do not necessarily generate indeterminacy, if accompanied by high values
of x. Equilibrium is determinate in the baseline model if and only if  + (1   )x= > 1; as shown by
Woodford (2003).
134.1. Wicksell and Taylor
As pointed out in Section 2.1, our simple baseline model implies that an actual real rate
that always matches its ecient counterpart ultimately closes the output gap, and vice versa.
Therefore, these two approaches to stabilizing the real economy|closing the output or the
interest rate gap|might be useful complements. To explore this possibility, we estimated a
model with a combined W&T rule of the form
it = it 1 + (1   )[r
e
t + t + xx
e
t] + "
i
t: (7)
This specication yields a modest improvement in t over the baseline W rule of 4
KR points, as shown in the rst panel of Table 3. This improvement represents positive
evidence that both the ecient real rate and the output gap contain useful information for
policymakers on the state of the real economy. However, the much larger improvement in
t obtained by substituting xe
t with re
t (21.4 KR points moving from the T rule to the W
rule), as compared to adding xe
t to re
t (4 KR points moving from the W rule to the W&T
rule), suggests that the latter is by far the most useful real indicator between the two. In
fact, the performance of the W&T rule is actually inferior to that of the W rule in several
of the alternative specications considered in the robustness exercises, further strengthening
the conclusion.
4.2. Estimates of the Ecient Real Rate and of the Output Gap
The evidence presented so far points to the ecient real rate as a crucial indicator for
monetary policy. Figure 1 illustrates its estimated behavior over time. It plots smoothed
posterior estimates of re
t under the W, T and W&T models, along with the eective FFR.
This picture drives home three important points.
First, the estimated ecient real interest rate is a good business cycle indicator, rising
during booms and dropping sharply in recessions. In fact, the ecient real interest rate
conveys early signals of the upcoming slowdown in all three recessions in our sample, dropping
sharply a few quarters before the recession actually starts, ahead of the turning point in the
FFR. Second, the inferred movements in re
t mirror quite closely those in the FFR, which
helps explain the empirical success of W rules.
14The close co-movement between the FFR and the estimates of re
t may raise the concern
that the observations on the nominal interest rate \explain" the estimates of re
t, and not vice
versa. However, this is not the case, which is the third important message of the gure. In
fact, the estimated time path of re
t in the two models whose policy rules include it (W and
W&T) is very close to that under the T specication, in which re
t does not aect interest rate
setting. The main dierence among the estimates is that the posterior distribution is tighter
when re
t enters the interest rate rule, as in the bands for the W&T specication shown in
the gure. This enhanced precision of the estimates suggests that the nominal interest rate
does carry useful information on re
t, as should be expected, but that this information does
not distort the inference on its median time-path.
Some intuition for the remarkable consistency of the estimates of re
t across models can be
gleaned from the expression for the ecient real interest rate presented in section 2, which
we report here for convenience
r
e
t = Ett+1 + Ett+1   !
 
Ety
e
t+1

:
If ecient output growth were not expected to deviate from the balanced growth path
(i.e. Etye
t+1 = 0), the ecient real interest rate would be the sum of the forecastable
movements in the growth rate of productivity t and in the intertemporal taste shock t: In
the estimated models, Etye
t+1 is indeed close to zero and the forecastable movements in t
are small. The taste shock t, on the contrary, is large and persistent, so that its movements
tend to be the main driving force of re
t. These movements are pinned down quite precisely
by the estimation procedure, making the inference on the evolution of the ecient real rate
remarkably consistent across models. In fact, this consistency extends well beyond the three
specications depicted in gure 1to virtually all the models considered in the robustness
exercises, as illustrated in Appendix F.
We conclude this section by looking at the estimated output gap. This exercise is an
important reality check on the baseline results, since one might wonder if the baseline T rule
does not t because it forces the interest rate to respond to an unreasonable gap measure.
Figure 2 shows that this is not the case. In fact, the ecient output gap obtained under
the T rule captures well the ups and downs of the business cycle, and conforms to standard
15views on the evolution of economic slack over the sample. Unlike with the estimates of re
t
reported in Figure 1, though, inference on the output gap is sensitive to the monetary policy
specication. Under the W and W&T rule, the output gap is less clearly cyclical than in the
T specication, which makes it a less reliable indicator of real activity than the ecient real
rate. This conclusion is further supported by the robustness analysis conducted in the next
section, which shows that the superiority of the W rule survives many alternative approaches
to measuring the output gap included in the T rule.
5. Robustness
The comparison between the baseline W and T rules conducted so far suggests that the
ecient interest rate captures the real economic developments to which the Federal Reserve
has responded over the past twenty ve years better than the ecient output gap. This
section demonstrates that this result does not depend on the arbitrary choice of the baseline
policy specications. Regardless of how we measure the output gap, or of how we choose the
other arguments of the policy function, W rules always t the data better than comparable
T rules. Moreover, this result remains true within a medium-scale DSGE model, along the
lines of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
5.1. Output Gap
The measure of the output gap included in the baseline T rule is the deviation of real GDP
from its ecient level. This choice is fairly common in DSGE work (Smets and Wouters,
2007, e.g.), but it is not without controversy in the broader macroeconomic literature, since
ecient output can only be computed within a fully specied model. In fact, Taylor rules
became so successful partly because they could be estimated without taking such a specic
stance on how to measure economic slack, nor on the rest of the model.
To bridge the gap between our general equilibrium framework and the empirical work
based on single equation methods, we examined several statistical approaches to the con-
struction of smooth versions of potential output. In this section, we focus on one such
approach, the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) lter, given its popularity in applied macroeco-
16nomics.11 The Appendix includes a discussion of our general approach to ltering within
DSGE models, as well as results for several other lters we experimented with.
To make the HP lter operational within the DSGE framework, we adapt the methodol-
ogy proposed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) for the approximation of ideal band pass
lters. These authors use forecasts and backcasts from an auxiliary time-series model|in
their case a simple unit root process|to extend the available vector of observations into the
innite past and future. They then apply the ideal lter to this extended sample. In our
implementation of their idea, the auxiliary model that generates the past and future dummy
observations is the linearized DSGE itself.
This approach is particularly convenient because it produces a very parsimonious recur-
sive expression for what we call the DSGE-HP gap xHP
t

1 + (1   L)
2 (1   F)
2
x
HP
t = (1   L)
2 (1   F)
2 yt; (8)
where the operators L and F are dened by Lyt = yt 1 and Fyt = Etyt+1, and the smoothing
parameter  is set at the typical quarterly value of 1600. This expression can thus be added
to the system of rational expectations equations that denes the equilibrium of the model
without dramatically augmenting the dimension of its state vector.12
When we estimate the model with a T rule in which xHP
t replaces the ecient output gap,
the t improves signicantly compared to the baseline T specication (about 15 KR points).
However, it remains below that of the baseline W rule by close to 6 points, as shown at the
bottom of panel I in Table 3. This dierence in t between the W rule and the T rule with
the HP output gap is fairly small in the baseline specication. However, in the next section
we show that the dierence becomes much larger (20 KR points) in the specications with
a time-varying ination target, which further improves the t of the model. Overall, these
11See Orphanides and Van Norden (2002) for a comprehensive survey of the use of statistical lters as
measures of the output gap and their pitfalls.
12The time series for the output gap obtained through this procedure (DSGE-HP) is very similar to that
produced by the standard nite sample approximation of the HP lter applied to the GDP data. This
result supports our use of the DSGE-HP lter as an eective detrending tool, which produces a measure of
economic slack similar to those often used in single-equation estimates of the Taylor rule.
17results conrm that the superior empirical performance of W over T rules is not sensitive to
the measurement of the output gap.
To further substantiate this conclusion, the Appendix reports the t of several alternative
models in which the output gap in the T rule is measured with a variety of other lters. None
of these alternative measures of the output gap helps the model t better than the DSGE-HP
gap described above. As an example, panel II of Table 3 considers the simplest among these
alternative lters: the quarterly growth rate of output, which is a fairly common choice in
estimated DSGEs. The performance of this T rule is in line with that of the baseline T
specication, and hence it is substantially worse than that of the baseline W rule.
5.2. Time-Varying Ination Target
In this section, we modify the baseline policy specication by introducing a time-varying
ination target (TVIT). This is a common feature in the recent empirical DSGE literature,
which helps capture the low-frequency movements in ination and the nominal interest rate
that are evident even in our relatively short sample (G urkaynak et al., 2005; Ireland, 2007;
Cogley et al., 2010; Del Negro and Eusepi, 2011; Del Negro et al., 2013). This addition
creates a new class of feedback rules, whose W&T version is
it = it 1 + (1   )[r
e
t + 

t + (t   

t) + xxt] + "
i
t; (9)
where 
t is an exogenous AR(1) process representing persistent deviations of the ination
target from its long-run value .13 The corresponding W rule has x = 0, while the T rule
does not include re
t.
The inclusion of a TVIT signicantly improves the t of the W model, as shown in panel
II of Table 3. Its KR ratio with respect to the baseline W specication is around 24 points,
very strong evidence in favor of the inclusion of this element in the policy rule. However, the
TVIT does not have an equally positive eect on the performance of the other specications.
As a result, the gap between the W rule and its competitors is even larger in this panel than
in the previous one. Among these competitors, the T rule with the HP output gap continues
13The autocorrelation coecient of 
t has a Beta prior tightly distributed around a mean of 0:95:
18to outperform the one with xe
t, but it is 20 KR points below the W rule. Moreover, the
W&T rule does not improve over the W rule, unlike in the baseline case.
These results suggest that the ecient real rate and a smoothly evolving ination target
enhance the empirical performance of the model through fairly independent channels. The
former helps improve the business cycle properties of the model, while the latter helps capture
the low frequency component of ination, making them complementary features in policy
specications with good empirical properties.
5.3. A Medium-Scale DSGE Model
We conclude our investigation of interest rate rules by extending the comparison of W
and T rules to a medium-scale DSGE model, along the lines of Christiano et al. (2005) and
Smets and Wouters (2007). The exact specication we adopt for the behavior of the private
sector behavior follows Justiniano et al. (2010) (henceforth, JPT), to which we refer the
reader for further details. To make the exercise more directly comparable to that conducted
in the baseline model, we estimate the JPT model on the same set of observables|GDP
growth, ination and the FFR|and on the same sample.
Panels III and IV of Table 3 report the results, which are even more strongly in favor
of the W rule. First, the improvement in t of the W over the T rule is 51 KR points, the
largest among all the models we considered. Second, adding the output gap to the W rule
to form the W&T specication brings a further improvement, which is however very small.
Also in this model, therefore, the ecient real rate is by far the most eective measure of real
economic developments from the perspective of monetary policy. Third, the introduction of
a TVIT improves the model's t, but it leaves intact the superiority of the W rule, which
now amounts to 39 KR points over the T rule.
To put these dierences in t in perspective, C urdia et al. (2011) report that the inclusion
of stochastic volatility within a DSGE structure very similar to that of JPT improves their
model's t by about 68 KR points. This consideration suggests that choosing an appropri-
ate policy specication can yield comparable gains in t as correctly specifying its driving
processes, which are widely regarded as crucial to the empirical success of these models.
19Finally, Figure 3 compares the estimated time series of re
t in the baseline and JPT models
under the W&T policy rule. We chose this specication because it is the best tting one, but
very similar results hold for the baseline W rule, as well as for the W&T and W rules with
a time varying ination target. The estimated ecient rate retains the cyclical properties
stressed in section 4.2 also in the JPT model, although its uctuations are more muted than
in the baseline. This reduction in estimated volatility is probably due to the richer set of
frictions (and shocks) included by JPT, which account for some of the movement in the
data through endogenous propagation and amplication channels omitted from the baseline
model. These channels reduce the role of the intertemporal shock t; which is the key driver
of the ecient rate in that model. We conclude that the estimates of the ecient real rate
are at least qualitatively robust to major changes in the model, as well as to changes in the
policy specication, as also illustrated in Figure 1.
6. Conclusions
Ever since Taylor (1993), central banks are universally described as setting short-term
interest rates in response to ination and some measure of the output gap. This paper
proposes an alternative view of the real factors driving interest rate decisions. It shows that
rules in which the policy instrument tracks the ecient interest rate as the main measure of
real economic developments t the data better than equivalent specications that respond
to the output gap. We refer to this class of rules as W rules, from Wicksell (1898), whose
neutral interest rate is a precursor of the ecient rate of return considered here.
Since this ecient rate is a counterfactual object|the rate of return that would prevail
under perfect competition|its measurement requires a structural model. Therefore, we
conducted our empirical investigation within a New Keynesian DSGE framework, using
Bayesian methods to estimate its parameters and to compare the t of many alternative
specications. Across all these specications, which dier for the details of the policy rule, as
well as for the assumptions on the behavior of the private sector, W rules proved consistently
superior to equivalent Taylor rules.
Notwithstanding its robustness, this result is subject to two important caveats. First,
20model specication matters, since our criterion of t depends on the interaction of the policy
rule with the rest of the model. More work across dierent models would therefore be
desirable, although we already address this issue by illustrating the robustness of the results
in two popular DSGE specications. Second, model comparison through marginal data
densities and Bayes factors applied to DSGE models is subject to some pitfalls, highlighted
for example by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2011). However, the large improvements in t
we uncovered when moving from W to T rules suggest that the specication of the policy
reaction function does make a signicant dierence.
Going forward, we expect to devote some of our research to further scrutinize the role
of the ecient real interest rate as a useful policy indicator, from both a positive and a
normative perspective. In particular, we would like to explore more realistic assumptions
on the information available to policy makers when taking their decisions, focusing on the
fact that the ecient real interest rate is not observable in practice, unlike in our model.
These assumptions would also give rise to an interesting tradeo between the usefulness of
re
t as a business cycle indicator, which we highlighted in this paper, and the (in)ability of
policymakers to observe it with precision, especially in real time.
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25Parameter Distribution 5% Median 95%
! G(1;0:2) 0.70 0.99 1.35
 G(0:1;0:05) 0.03 0.09 0.19
 B(0:6;0:2) 0.25 0.61 0.90
 B(0:6;0:2) 0.25 0.61 0.90
 B(0:7;0:15) 0.43 0.72 0.92
 N(1:5;0:25) 1.09 1.50 1.91
4x N(0:5;0:2) 0.17 0.50 0.83
400 N(2;1) 0.36 2.00 3.64
400r N(2;1) 0.36 2.00 3.64
400 N(3;0:35) 2.42 3.00 3.58
 B(0:5;0:2) 0.17 0.50 0.83
 B(0:5;0:2) 0.17 0.50 0.83
u B(0:5;0:2) 0.17 0.50 0.83
 IG1(0:5;2) 0.17 0.34 1.24
 IG1(0:5;2) 0.17 0.34 1.24
u IG1(0:5;2) 0.17 0.34 1.24
i IG1(0:5;2) 0.17 0.34 1.24
Table 1: Prior distributions for the parameters in the baseline model. G stands for Gamma, B stands for
Beta, N stands for Normal and IG1 stands for Inverse Gamma 1, with mean and standard deviation in
parenthesis
26Summary statistics T rule W rule
ML -371.45 -360.74
KR -21.6 |
Std("i
tjT) 0.30 0.29
Parameter 5% Median 95% 5% Median 95%
! 0.70 0.99 1.35 0.66 0.94 1.29
100 0.08 0.21 0.50 1.49 3.03 5.54
 0.49 0.62 0.73 0.35 0.47 0.58
 0.10 0.48 0.81 0.06 0.18 0.39
 0.65 0.75 0.82 0.78 0.81 0.84
 0.70 1.14 1.62 1.24 1.47 1.73
4x 0.95 1.19 1.44 | | |
400 1.89 2.38 2.85 1.84 2.39 2.92
400r 0.89 1.88 2.86 1.70 2.34 2.98
400 2.48 2.93 3.39 2.40 2.95 3.50
 0.85 0.91 0.95 0.28 0.63 0.85
 0.21 0.55 0.89 0.93 0.97 0.99
u 0.06 0.37 0.73 0.81 0.89 0.93
 0.81 1.29 2.05 0.21 0.78 2.16
 0.65 1.88 3.69 0.85 1.07 1.39
u 0.18 0.41 0.60 0.20 0.29 0.44
i 0.25 0.33 0.42 0.23 0.31 0.38
Table 2: Estimation results for the baseline T and W specications. ML is the marginal likelihood. KR is
the KR ratio with respect to the W model. Std("i
tjT) is the standard deviation of the smoothed sequence of
monetary policy residuals. 5%, Median, and 95% are the 5th percentile, the median, and the 95th percentile
of the posterior distribution for each parameter from the MCMC draws. The posterior of the slope of the
Phillips curve is quoted as 100 because it would otherwise be too small in the T specication.
27Name Policy Rule (i
t) KR ML
Panel I: Baseline & Output Gaps
W re
t + t -360.7
T t + xxe
t -21.4
W&T re
t + t + xxe
t 4.0
T with HP Gap t + xxHP
t -5.6
T with Growth t + y(yt   yt 1) -21.2
Panel II: Time Varying Ination Target (TVIT)
W re
t + 
t + (t   
t) -348.9
T 
t + (t   
t) + xxe
t -32.0
W&T re
t + 
t + (t   
t) + xxe
t 0.1
T with HP Gap 
t + (t   
t) + xxHP
t -20.0
T with Growth 
t + (t   
t) + y(yt   yt 1) -36.3
Panel III: JPT Model
W re
t + t -19.1
T t + xxe
t -50.9
W&T re
t + t + xxe
t 3.8
Panel IV: JPT Model with TVIT
W re
t + 
t + (t   
t) -12.3
T 
t + (t   
t) + xxe
t -38.9
W&T re
t + 
t + (t   
t) + xxe
t 1.3
Table 3: Comparison of policy rules. Each panel shows the log-marginal likelihood (ML) for the relevant W
rule, and the KR ratio for the other rules relative to the W rule. The second column contains the systematic
component of the rule under consideration in the absence of interest rate smoothing (i
t), dened such that
it = it 1 + (1   )i
t + "i
t.
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Figure 1: Eective Federal Funds rate (FFR) and smoothed estimates of the ecient real interest rate across
three policy specications (W&T, W and T) in the baseline model. The rates are demeaned and expressed
in annualized percentage points. The thicker lines are the posterior medians of the ecient real rate in the
baseline model estimated with the W&T, W, and T policy rules. Dierent shades of light blue represent
the 50, 70 and 90 percent posterior probability bands for the W&T specication. Vertical grey areas mark
NBER recessions.
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Figure 2: Smoothed posterior median estimates of the ecient output gap across three policy specications
(W&T, W and T) in the baseline model. Vertical grey areas mark NBER recessions.
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Figure 3: Smoothed posterior median estimates of the ecient real interest rate in the baseline and JPT
models, both estimated with the W&T rule. The rates are demeaned and expressed in annualized percentage
points. Dierent shades of light blue represent the 50,70 and 90 percent posterior probability bands for the
W&T specication. Vertical grey areas mark NBER recessions.
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